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Abstract: Civil jury instructions are inconsistent in defi ning what constitutes noneconom-
ic damages, which may include pain, suffering, disability, disfi gurement, and loss of en-
joyment of life (LEL), among other injury sequelae. This inconsistency has been mani-
fested recently in court decisions that have considered whether LEL should be treated as 
a separate element of noneconomic damages, distinct from pain and suffering. This pa-
per reviews the case law on this issue and also describes a jury simulation experiment. 
Mock jurors awarded damages after they received instructions on noneconomic damag-
es in which LEL was (1) not identifi ed as a distinct element of damages; (2) defi ned as 
an element of damages distinct from pain and suffering, but participants awarded a single 
amount for noneconomic damages; or (3) defi ned as a distinct element of damages, and 
participants awarded separate amounts for LEL and pain and suffering. Instructions about 
LEL resulted in larger awards, but only when mock jurors also made a separate award for 
that element of damages. 
Key words: noneconomic damages, pain and suffering, juries, emotional distress 
The recovery of damages for noneconomic injuries has a lengthy and controver-
sial history (O’Connell & Bailey, 1972). Although there is some debate about whether 
to abolish or sharply curtail plaintiffs’ ability to recover noneconomic damages (Cal-
fee & Rubin, 1992; Geistfeld, 1995; Jaffe, 1953; Morris, 1959; Plant, 1958), some de-
gree of compensation for psychological injury is now almost universal. Because these 
damages are impossible to quantify by any standard measurement, it is an area where 
the jury has substantial discretion that is not particularly amenable to principled ju-
dicial review. For this reason, judges have long feared overcompensation of injured 
plaintiffs by sympathetic juries and have accordingly tried to create standards to con-
strain that discretion before the fact—that is, to limit the type of proof necessary and 
the circumstances under which noneconomic damages can be awarded. We see this 
most clearly with tort claims that involve only emotional distress, such as the tort of 
54                      POSER, BORNSTEIN, & MCGORTY IN LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 27 (2003)
Intentional Infl iction of Emotional Distress, where the standard to state a claim re-
quires not only “severe emotional distress,” to the plaintiff, but also “extreme and 
outrageous conduct” by the defendant (Restatement of Torts 2nd, 846). 
Controversy over emotional distress damages is not limited to independent claims 
for emotional distress. It extends to, and is more common for, claims for emotion-
al distress that are parasitic on claims for personal injury (Perrin & Sales, 1993). Al-
though there are numerous categories of emotional distress damages, 1 the two main 
categories are pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life (LEL; also referred to 
as “hedonic” damages). Pain and suffering is usually associated with feelings of phys-
ical pain, as well as anxiety, depression, worry, fright, grief, and humiliation (Fantozzi 
v. Sandusky Cement Prod. Co., 1992). LEL damages, on the other hand, are intended 
to compensate “for the limitations on the person’s life created by the injury” (Thomp-
son v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 1980, p. 824). These include normal, daily 
activities as well as special interests and hobbies previously enjoyed (Bennett v. Lem-
bo, 2000; Boan v. Blackwell, 2001; McDougald v. Garber, 1989). One way of concep-
tualizing the distinction is that pain and suffering refers principally to the occurrence 
of new, negative harms resulting from an injury (e.g., pain, distress) whereas LEL re-
fers to the loss of previously enjoyed positive capacities (Coyle, 2001; “Loss of en-
joyment of life as a separate element of damages,” 1981). 
Thus, a plaintiff who was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the de-
fendant might be able to collect damages for “any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety or 
other mental or emotional distress” he has suffered and will likely suffer as a result of 
the accident. In addition, under the rubric of LEL, the plaintiff might also seek com-
pensation for his “inability. . . to carry on and enjoy life in a manner had the accident 
not occurred” (Bennett v. Lembo, 2000, p. 497). In one case, evidence as to current 
and future loss of enjoyment included the following: 
The plaintiffs and their children testifi ed that after the accident, Mr. Bennett ceased engag-
ing in many activities, including taking long vacations by car with his wife who does not 
drive, frequently visiting his daughter and grandchildren on Cape Cod, lifting weights, at-
tending aerobics classes with his wife, wrestling with his grandchildren and coaching them 
in sports, mowing the lawn, and assisting his children with their home improvement proj-
ects. (Bennett v. Lembo, 2000, p. 496) 
In another case, the court distinguished pain and suffering, which “encompasses 
the physical discomfort caused by an injury,” from LEL, describing the latter as in-
cluding “daily life activities that are common to most people” including “going on 
a fi rst date, reading, debating politics, the sense of taste, recreational activities, and 
family activities” (Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Johnson, 2001, p. 381). 
THE CASE LAW ON LOST ENJOYMENT OF LIFE 
The diffi culty in quantifying noneconomic damages has not prevented judges 
from making assumptions about their quantifi cation. A review of the case law reveals 
that there is a common assumption that the overall monetary award for noneconom-
1 For example, emotional distress damages may include a separate category of “permanent im-
pairment” as in Bennett v. Lembo (2000); “physical impairment” as in Wal-Mart Stores v. Holland 
(1997); and “permanent disability” as in Swiler v. Baker’s Super Market (1979). 
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ic harm will be higher if damages for pain and suffering, on the one hand, and dam-
ages for LEL, on the other hand, are treated by the jury as separate elements leading 
to separate compartmentalized damage awards (Canfi eld v. Sandock, 1990; Leiker v. 
Gafford, 1989; McDougald v. Garber, 1989). In this paper, we review the current sta-
tus of this issue and test this assumption with a jury simulation experiment. 
Most courts allow the parties to present evidence of and advocate for both types 
of damages (Hermes, 1987). Thus, the injured plaintiff can testify about the pain and 
anxiety that her injury has caused her and about all of the life activities in which she 
can no longer participate because of the injury. But there is a division among courts 
about whether the jury should be instructed to consider these as separate categories 
of damages that lead to separate and distinct monetary awards, or whether the jury 
should lump the two types of emotional injuries together for the purposes of making 
a monetary award. At present, it appears that a majority of courts that have addressed 
this issue have adopted the former approach whereas a substantial minority of courts 
do not allow for the separate treatment of damages for LEL (American Law Reports, 
1984/2000; Hermes, 1987). The trend in recent years has been for courts increasingly 
to allow LEL as a separate element of damages (American Law Reports, 1984/2000). 
As mentioned previously, a recurring rationale offered by judges for treating LEL 
and pain and suffering damages together is that to do otherwise would result in high-
er, and therefore duplicative, damages, leading to overcompensation of the plaintiff.2 
Many courts have made this assertion without any apparent evidence of its accu-
racy, or of how they arrived at this conclusion. The Kansas Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, after recognizing that LEL is “arguably distinct from pain and suffering,” sim-
ply stated that, “[i]n the majority of cases loss of enjoyment of life as a separate cat-
egory of damages would result in a duplication or over lapping of damages” (Leik-
er v. Gafford, 1989, pp. 339, 340; see also Fireboard v. Pool, 1991). The New York 
Court of Appeals asserted that nonpecuniary damages would increase if loss of enjoy-
ment was a separate category, arguing that the fact “[t]hat separate awards are advo-
cated by plaintiffs and resisted by defendants is suffi cient evidence that larger awards 
are at stake here” (McDougald v. Garber, 1989, p. 2.57). The McDougald court char-
acterized these larger awards as a further “distortion” of the inaccuracies inherent 
in emotional distress damages. This sentiment was echoed by the Indiana Supreme 
Court, which stated, “we think instructions which defi ne loss of ‘quality and enjoy-
ment of life’ as a separate element of damages send a jury to its deliberations too un-
constrained with respect to damages” (Canfi eld v. Sandock, 1990, pp. 1281–1282). 
The courts that treat LEL and pain and suffering as separate elements of damages 
consider LEL to be conceptually distinct and therefore properly treated as an indepen-
dent element of damages in the quest for full compensation (Abbinante v. O’Connell, 
1996; Boan v. Blackwell, 2001; Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Products, 1992; Thomp-
2 More compensation does not necessarily equal overcompensation, for at least two reasons. 
First, there is no true measuring stick to indicate how much any given noneconomic injury should 
be worth. Second, research shows that on the whole, plaintiffs are substantially undercompensat-
ed relative to their economic injury costs (Sloan & Hsieh, 1990; Sloan & van Wert, 1991); so im-
plementing a procedure that did happen to increase total compensation might actually turn out to be 
more just in the sense of providing plaintiffs fuller compensation. 
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son v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 1980; see generally American Law Re-
ports, 1984/2000). The judge in Thompson apparently did not see a duplication risk 
and opined that had loss of enjoyment been included with another element of damag-
es, the monetary award for that element would have been higher to include the loss of 
enjoyment damages (Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 1980). Thus, 
some judges do not believe that keeping the elements separate results in higher over-
all awards for noneconomic damages (see also Boan v. Blackwell, 2001). 
There are other ways in which courts handle this issue that do not fall neatly into 
the two categories described previously, and about a dozen states have not directly 
addressed the issue (American Law Reports, 1984/2000). 
As with any attempt to understand how decisions should best be made, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the descriptive and normative questions (Baron, 1994; 
Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988). The “duplication” rationale for combining pain and 
suffering, and LEL under one rubric of damages tends to confl ate these two questions 
by failing to distinguish the empirical, descriptive question (Do jury decisions about 
damage awards rise when pain and suffering and LEL are treated separately?) from 
the normative question (Should pain and suffering and LEL be treated separately?). 
The answer to the normative question depends at least in part on how one views the 
function of emotional distress damages. If one believes that these damages are only 
nominally compensatory and function more to provide the plaintiff vindication or sol-
ace (Jaffe, 1953), then it might be less important that LEL and pain and suffering are 
considered distinct. If, on the other hand, one views emotional distress damages as 
truly compensatory, despite diffi culty in measuring them, one might be more inclined 
to treat them separately. 
This distinction is sometimes refl ected in how judges rule on the question of 
whether LEL and pain and suffering should be treated together or separately. Judg-
es who have held that these types of damages should be distinct tend to justify their 
decisions on the basis that they are compensating different things (Abbinante v. 
O’Connell, 1996; Boan v. Blackwell, 2001; Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Products, 
1992; Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 1980). The pain one experi-
ences from injuries, the argument goes, is entirely distinct from the psychic loss expe-
rienced by one who can no longer engage in one’s favorite activities. One court dis-
tinguished these by denoting the former “subjective” and the latter “objective” (Boan 
v. Blackwell, 2001). Courts that have treated LEL and pain and suffering as one ele-
ment of damages, on the other hand, usually justify this decision as the only way to 
avoid duplication of damages (Leiker v. Gafford, 1989; Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 
1998). This argument could refl ect a belief that the pain and suffering experienced 
from the injury itself is similar to the pain and suffering experienced from the loss of 
pleasurable activities. It could also, however, refl ect the belief that these damages are 
not truly compensatory and that one should therefore err on the side of limiting the le-
gal fi ction (McDougald v. Garber, 1989, p. 257). 
Exploring which side of the normative debate is correct is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Addressing the descriptive question, however, helps to focus the normative 
question (Baron, 1994; Bell et al., 1988). If there is no change in the overall award 
when LEL and pain and suffering are treated separately, then answering the norma-
tive question will not affect outcomes. If, however, treating LEL and pain and suf-
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fering separately does signifi cantly affect the overall award, then we will be forced 
to confront the normative question of what this difference refl ects duplication or full 
compensation? The results of the jury experiment described herein sets the stage for 
that normative inquiry but cannot answer it. 
CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON HEDONIC DAMAGES 
Despite an accumulating body of research on how jurors make damage awards 
(for reviews, see Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Hans, 2000; Vidmar, 1998), hedonic 
damages have received scant empirical attention. What research has been conduct-
ed has found that the effect of an injury on a person’s lifestyle (i.e., LEL) is strongly 
correlated with people’s (e.g., mock jurors’) perceptions of the injury’s severity and 
their noneconomic damage awards (Andrews, Meyer, & Berla’, 1996; Wissler, Ev-
ans, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997). Although LEL seems like a rather nebulous concept, 
it can in fact be measured somewhat reliably, at least in relative terms (i.e., in com-
paring different injuries to one another; see Andrews et al., 1996; McNally, Meyer, & 
Berla’, 2001; Terman, 1995). 
For example, Andrews et al. (1996) developed a “Lost-Pleasure-of-Life” scale 
by having practicing psychologists who were experienced in disability evaluation 
judge the severity of impact that a large number of behavioral descriptors of im-
pairment (e.g., loss of bladder control, inability to play with children) would have 
on a person’s enjoyment of life. The specifi c impairments clustered into four areas 
of functioning: practical (e.g., diffi culty writing), emotional/psychological (e.g., 
sleep disruption), social (e.g., decreased participation in previously rewarding ac-
tivities), and occupational (e.g., loss of vocational identity). Various groups of in-
dividuals (psychologists, graduate students, and undergraduates) perceived the be-
havioral descriptors’ impact on an injured person’s pleasure of life in an equiva-
lent fashion, and subsequent research showed that the perceived hedonic impact of 
losing various behavioral capabilities does not differ as a function of hypothetical 
plaintiffs’ gender or age, nor does it differ as a function of the perceiver’s gender 
(McNally et al., 2001).3
In the present experiment, we tested assumptions about the effect of allowing LEL 
damages by comparing jury awards under three different approaches: allowing LEL 
as a separate category of noneconomic damages, distinct from pain and suffering; de-
scribing LEL and pain and suffering separately to the jury, but asking the jury to make 
a single award for noneconomic damages; and making no distinction between these 
types of damages in the jury instructions and asking the jury to make a single lump-
sum award. The principal question addressed by this experiment was whether treating 
LEL as its own category of damages—merely conceptually or, in addition, by requir-
ing a separate judgment—would infl ate total damage awards. 
3 It goes without saying that perceived, and actual, LEL will, nonetheless, vary depending on 
plaintiffs’ particular circumstances. For example, an amateur cellist who meets weekly to play with 
friends in a string quartet will lose more enjoyment if his injury prevents him from playing the cello 
than, say, an amateur cellist who plays only once or twice a year. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were 122 law students (54% female, 89% White, M age = 24.47, 
Mdn age = 23) and 77 psychology students (64% female, 91 % White, M age = 21.53, 
Mdn age = 20).4 The psychology students received extra course credit, whereas the 
law students participated as part of a class exercise. Two psychology students gave 
unusable data, leaving 197 total participants for analysis (38–43 per instruction con-
dition for the law students, and 25 per condition for the psychology students). 
Materials 
The two-page case summary described an automobile negligence case (on the ba-
sis of Abbinante v. O’Connell, 1996), involving an inattentive driver who veered off 
the road and hit a pedestrian. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff, an 18-year-old 
woman, sustained severe back injuries (i.e., spinal curvature and rigidity along with 
early degenerative arthritis in the lower spine). A physician testifi ed that the plaintiff 
would continue to suffer further back complications and pain because of the strain of 
her spine compensating for her injuries. In addition, the plaintiff complained of mi-
graines and pain while sitting and sleeping. 
The physician testifi ed that the plaintiff’s activities would be permanently limited. 
Because of her injuries, the plaintiff could no longer jog, run, or perform any activi-
ties that require swinging the arms. Because the plaintiff previously had played soc-
cer and softball, enjoyed jogging and rollerblading, and participated in typical physi-
cal activities with her friends, she claimed that her life had become greatly disrupted 
by her injuries (i.e., that she had lost pleasure of life). 
Design and Procedure 
The design was a 2 (participant) × 3 (instruction) between-groups factorial. After 
signing an informed consent form, participants read the instructions, which explained 
that they would be asked to imagine themselves as jurors in a case involving an au-
tomobile-pedestrian accident. The instructions also informed them that the defendant 
had been found liable for the plaintiff’s injuries, that their jury had already deter-
mined how much to award the plaintiff for economic damages, and that their task was 
to award noneconomic damages. 
Participants then read the case summary, at the end of which they received the 
judge’s instructions about what they should consider when determining noneconomic 
damages. The instructions differed depending on condition. Participants in the unitary 
condition (N = 68) were given a defi nition of pain and suffering (i.e., “any pain, discom-
fort, fears, anxiety or other mental or emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and any 
4 The law students were in their fi rst semester of law school, had not yet covered the law of dam-
ages in their torts class, and were therefore unlikely to be signifi cantly more “expert” than their psy-
chology counterparts. 
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similar suffering that would probably be experienced in the future”). In addition to re-
ceiving this defi nition of pain and suffering, participants in the LEL/lump sum condi-
tion (N = 66) and LEL/separate conditions (N = 63) were given a defi nition of LEL (i.e., 
“the inability of the plaintiff to carry on and enjoy a life in a manner had the accident 
not occurred”) and told that LEL is separate and distinct from pain and suffering. 
Participants in the unitary and LEL/lump sum conditions were asked to award 
a single amount for noneconomic damages. Participants in the LEL/separate con-
dition were asked to divide the total award into (1) damages for pain and suffer-
ing and (2) damages for LEL. Thus, the two LEL conditions differed from the 
unitary condition in that they distinguished conceptually between pain and suf-
fering and LEL; they differed from each other in whether participants made a 
single award (LEL/lump sum) or divided the award into two separate compo-
nents (LEL/separate). 
After making an award, the participants gave their perceptions of the case by rat-
ing the following on 7-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): the severity of 
the plaintiff’s injuries, the severity of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, the degree to 
which the plaintiffs activities had been limited, and their overall perceptions of the lit-
igants. To determine whether participants understood the judge’s instructions for their 
condition, they were asked whether the judge’s instructions specifi cally told them to 
consider LEL separate from pain and suffering (77.3–82.5% correct, depending on 
condition), and they rated the comprehensibility of the instructions and their diffi culty 
in deciding on an award amount (both 7-point scales). Participants also provided de-
mographic information. 
All participants completed the questionnaire in a classroom setting (the law stu-
dents were members of two sections of torts, but they had not yet covered the con-
cepts of negligence or damages). Participants were instructed not to look back at the 
case or the amount(s) they awarded. The entire procedure took approximately 20 min-
utes, at the end of which participants received a debriefi ng form. 
RESULTS 
To normalize the distribution, the damage awards were transformed logarithmical-
ly (e.g., Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996). Two-way ANOVAs (Instruction × Partic-
ipant) were used to determine the difference between the conditions on the following 
variables: log of total damage award (for the LEL/separate condition, the total was 
the sum of the two component awards), the comprehensibility of the instructions, and 
their diffi culty deciding an award amount. The case perception variables were ana-
lyzed by two-way MANOVAs. 
Damages 
Descriptive data are presented in Table 1. For the log of the total damage awards, 
there was a main effect of instruction, F(2, 191) = 13.99, p < .001. Post hoc compar-
isons (Tukey’s HSD, p < .05) showed that participants in the LEL/separate condition 
(M = $2,566,270, Mdn = $1,000,000) gave greater awards than did those in either the 
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unitary condition (M = $561,721, Mdn = $112,500) or LEL/lump sum condition (M = 
$849,455, Mdn = $500,000), which were statistically equivalent to each other. In the 
LEL/separate condition, participants awarded less for the pain-and-suffering compo-
nent (M = $952,222, Mdn = $250,000) than for the lost-enjoyment component (M = 
$1,628,905, Mdn = $500,000). There was no main effect of participant, F(1, 191) = 
1.10, and the interaction was also nonsignifi cant, F(2, 191) = 2.69. 
Case Perceptions 
There was a signifi cant multivariate effect of instruction on participants’ percep-
tions of the case, F(10, 374) = 1.88, p < .05. Neither the main effect of participant, 
F(5, 187) = 2.07, nor the interaction, F(10, 374) = 0.96, was statistically signifi cant. 
Follow-up two-way ANOVAs indicated that instruction signifi cantly affected partic-
ipants’ ratings of the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, F(2, 191) = 3.85, p < .05, and 
the degree to which her injuries limited her activities, F(2, 191) = 3.99, p < .05. In 
both cases, participants in the LEL/separate condition perceived the plaintiff more fa-
vorably than participants in the LEL/lump sum condition (Tukey’s HSD, ps < .05; see 
Table 1). There was also a tendency to perceive the severity of the plaintiff’s injury 
as greater in the LEL/separate condition than in the unitary condition (Tukey’s HSD, 
p = .078). Finally, there was a comparable effect of instruction condition on partici-
pants’ overall perception of the plaintiff, although it was also only marginally signifi -
cant, F(2, 191) = 2.53, p = .082 (see Table 1). Taken as a whole, these results suggest 
that even though the plaintiff’s injuries were identical in all conditions, the judge’s in-
structions infl uenced how those injuries were perceived. 
Task Diffi culty 
There were two measures of task diffi culty: ratings of the degree to which partici-
pants understood the judge’s instruction and the diffi culty picking an award. For the un-
MEASURING DAMAGES FOR LOST ENJOYMENT OF LIFE                                  61
derstanding of the judge’s instructions, there was a main effect of condition, F(2,191) 
= 5.41, p < .01 (see Table 1 for means). Overall, participants in the LEL/separate con-
dition reported greater understanding than did participants in the unitary condition 
(Tukey’s HSD, p < .05); comprehension levels in the LEL/lump sum condition were in-
termediate and did not differ signifi cantly from either of the other two conditions. Thus, 
distinguishing between LEL and pain and suffering damages confers a comprehension 
advantage, but only when that distinction is refl ected in the verdict form. There was nei-
ther a main effect of participant nor an interaction on comprehension ratings, Fs < 3.3. 
The degree to which participants found it diffi cult to pick an award was not affected by 
either variable, nor was there a signifi cant interaction. Fs < 1.3. 
DISCUSSION 
The present experiment is an attempt to address systematically the legal assump-
tions underlying the debate about whether or not to treat LEL as a discrete compo-
nent of damages. As is true of the study of jury damage awards in general, the an-
swer is not simple. We found that, on the one hand, distinguishing between LEL 
and pain and suffering does not invariably lead to higher damage awards than in-
structing mock jurors on pain and suffering alone, as evidenced by the equivalence 
between the unitary and LEL/lump sum conditions. On the other hand, distinguish-
ing between LEL and pain and suffering conceptually and requiring mock jurors to 
make separate awards for these two elements of noneconomic damages does lead to 
higher awards, as evidenced by the difference between the LEL/separate condition 
and the other conditions. 
Previous research has found that special verdict forms, along the lines of the 
LEL/separate condition, enhance juror comprehension and lead to more equita-
ble awards (Greene & Bornstein, 2000). Here, itemizing award components did 
enhance mock jurors’ (reports of) comprehension, but it also increased their total 
awards. In contrast, merely instructing them on LEL without requiring a separate 
award for it—which is the standard procedure in some jurisdictions that allow dam-
ages for LEL (American Law Reports, 1984/2000; Hermes, 1987)—did not lead to 
higher awards than when participants were not instructed on LEL. Thus, the con-
cept of LEL, in and of itself, does not appear to affect awards, but requiring a sepa-
rate judgment for LEL does. 
The observation that in this study, compartmentalizing noneconomic damages led 
to higher awards than when participants awarded a single lump-sum award, begs the 
question of whether a higher award is “better” or “worse.” As noted previously, larger 
awards when LEL is treated as a discrete element might refl ect duplication of awards, 
but it might not. Whether or not higher awards in circumstances where plaintiffs have 
suffered signifi cant noneconomic injury are desirable is a normative question that the 
present data cannot answer. 
Nonetheless, our data do provide an initial, descriptive step in addressing what 
happens when jurors are instructed on LEL. Merely instructing mock jurors that they 
could consider LEL in making their awards did not, in and of itself, result in larg-
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er awards. Why, then, should requiring them to award damages for LEL, apart from 
damages for pain and suffering, infl ate the total award? One explanation is that par-
ticipants had diffi culty compartmentalizing the different elements of noneconomic 
damages. Research shows that although mock jurors can some times compartmen-
talize different elements of damages successfully (Cather et al., 1996; Landsman, Di-
amond, Dimitropoulos, & Saks, 1998), they often fail to keep different categories of 
damages straight (see Greene & Bornstein, in press, for a review). For example, their 
awards for some types of damages (e.g., punitive damages) may be infl uenced by fac-
tors (e.g., injury severity) that are relevant only to another type of damages (compen-
sation, in the case of injury severity). In addition, barring jurors from awarding one 
type of damages can result in that category “spilling over” into another type of award 
(Anderson & MacCoun, 1999; Greene, Coon, & Bornstein, 2001). Participants might 
indeed have had diffi culty keeping LEL and pain and suffering separate when they 
had to make separate awards. 
Although it is possible that participants had a hard time segregating their sub-
awards in the LEL/separate condition, another fi nding suggests an intriguing alterna-
tive explanation. Participants in the LEL/separate condition perceived the plaintiff’s 
injuries as more severe and more limiting than participants in the other conditions, 
even though the description of her injuries was identical in all conditions. Thus, the 
instructions in the LEL/separate condition appear to have had the inadvertent effect of 
infl uencing how participants perceived the evidence in the case. Consistent with pre-
vious research (e.g., Bornstein, 1998; Bovbjerg, Sloan, & Blumstein, 1989; Robben-
nolt, 2000; Wissler et al., 1997), across all conditions, there was a positive correla-
tion between participants’ damage awards and their perceptions of the plaintiff’s inju-
ry severity, r = .14, p < .06, and the degree to which her injury limited her activities, r 
= .23, p < .001. Perhaps both distinguishing LEL from pain and suffering and requir-
ing separate awards had the effect of calling greater attention to the previous capaci-
ties that the plaintiff had lost. Consequently, her injury seemed more severe, and she 
was awarded greater compensation. 
Indeed, it is possible that the “LEL effect” obtained in this study is the result of 
using a relatively pared-down mock trial, in which the plaintiff’s injuries and jury in-
structions were especially salient. However, prior research has shown that the meth-
odological complexity and verisimilitude of jury simulation research do not substan-
tially affect the outcome of the research (Bornstein, 1999; Kramer & Kerr, 1989). 
With respect to the plaintiff’s injuries, a more realistic trial, with a fl esh-and-blood 
plaintiff, could easily make her injuries more, rather than less, dramatic and salient. 
Regarding the salience of the jury instructions about LEL, it is a well-documented 
fi nding that slight variations in instructions can signifi cantly affect jurors’ comprehen-
sion and their verdicts, even when the trial materials are relatively complex (Greene 
& Bornstein, 2000). 
Thus, although we favor replicating the present results using more realistic materi-
als in order to be more confi dent of their generality, we fi nd no reason to suspect that 
the results would change. Finally, we note that the present fi nding that undergraduate 
and law student mock jurors did not differ in their verdicts confi rms previous research 
demonstrating few systematic differences among different samples of mock jurors 
(Bornstein, 1999), even when some of the mock jurors are knowledgeable about law 
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(Landsman & Rakos, 1994; Vidmar & Rice, 1993; though as noted previously, the 
fi rst-semester law students used here were not especially knowledgeable). 
Future Directions 
The present research is but a fi rst step in exploring how jurors award damages for 
LEL, and there are a number of interesting avenues for future research. For exam-
ple, in cases where emotional distress is the primary cause of action, expert testimony 
about the extent and effects of the alleged injury is quite common (Goodman-Dela-
hunty & Foote, 1995; Perrin & Sales, 1993), and it would undoubtedly be present in 
most LEL cases as well. A 1985 civil rights case, Sherrod v. Berry (1985), was the 
fi rst case in which expert testimony was admitted for the purpose of quantifying dam-
ages for LEL in a wrongful death case. In that case, the injury was fatal and the expert 
was allowed to testify as to the “hedonic value” of the victim’s life (Sherrod v. Berry, 
1985/1988; see also Miller, 1989; Terman, 1995). Although the courts are wary of the 
propriety of admitting the testimony of such “hedonic” experts, such testimony has 
been allowed recently in Mississippi (Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Johnson, 2001), as 
well as in Illinois, California, and Alaska (Miller, 1989; see also Coyle, 2001). 
The most common method of quantifying pain and suffering damages, attributed to 
the attorney Melvin Belli (e.g., Belli, 1982, §64.3), is the “per diem” method (see also 
Dobbs, 1973; Laughery, Paige, Bean, & Wogalter, 2001; Werchick, 1965). Accord-
ing to this approach, jurors are encouraged to multiply some unit of time (e.g., a day) 
by a dollar amount that seems to correspond to the plaintiff’s injury. The same tech-
nique could be applied to LEL. For example, a paraplegic’s inability to take her night-
ly neighborhood walk might be estimated to be worth $5/day; a plaintiff with a life ex-
pectancy of 30 more years would therefore warrant $54,570 for future LEL ($5/day × 
365 days/year × 30 years). Using this algorithm, relatively low rates, as in the $5/day 
example, can translate into quite substantial total awards.5 Obviously, adding up simi-
lar computations for all of the other pleasurable activities that a paraplegic is no longer 
able to do could produce a hefty sum, and future research should address the effect on 
LEL awards of variations in how lost enjoyment is quantifi ed (Laughery et al., 2001). 
An alternative approach to calculating damages for LEL is the “willingness to 
pay” method. This method values an injury by analyzing, on average, how much peo-
ple are willing to pay to reduce the possibility of that injury. This approach has gained 
broad acceptance among economists (Miller, 1989) and is used by federal agencies in 
creating regulatory guidelines that must rely on a cost-benefi t analysis in determin-
ing which safety procedures to adopt (Miller, 1989). It has also been adapted by ex-
perts testifying about noneconomic damages for both fatal and nonfatal injuries (Mc-
5 The propriety of the per diem approach is quite controversial because of concerns that it would 
be prejudicial, by leading jurors to treat it as evidence rather than argument. Dobbs (1973, p. 546) 
concludes, “Apparently the real basis of most decisions [to bar per diem arguments] is simply a dis-
trust of the jury and a feeling that the jury will be too easily impressed by the apparent certitude of 
the mathematical calculations.” Consequently, it is usually subject to a cautionary instruction by the 
judge when it is allowed (e.g., Vanskike v. ACF Industries, 1981) or sometimes prohibited altogether 
(e.g., Botta v. Brunner, 1958; for a review of the relevant case law, see Belli, 1982). 
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Caffery, Kahneman, & Spitzer, 1995; Miller, 1989), although it remains controver-
sial in that context (Coyle, 2001) and is rarely allowed (Danner v. Mid-State Paving 
Co., 1965; Dunlap v. Lee, 1962). For example, the California Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that noneconomic damages can be measured objectively (Beagle v. Vasold, 
1966). Relying on Beagle, the California Appellate Court recently rejected expert tes-
timony that calculated damages using the “willingness to pay” method (Loth v. Truck-
A-Way, 1998, pp. 765-766). 
Experimental research could address the effect on LEL awards of different means 
of quantifi cation (e.g., per diem vs. lump sum vs. willingness to pay), different ways 
of expressing the per diem amount (e.g., $24/day vs. $1/hr), the source of the quanti-
fi cation (expert testimony, attorney argument, plaintiff’s testimony), whether the de-
fense presents an alternative quantifi cation, and so forth. For example, attorney’s ar-
guments at trial could be explored to see if they are capable of either negating or mag-
nifying the impact of judicial instructions that allow jurors to consider LEL. 
Practical and Policy Implications 
On a practical level, the empirical question of whether, and under what circum-
stances, treating hedonic damages as a separate element of damages infl ates total 
damage awards is signifi cant in a number of respects. First, it would strengthen law-
yers’ efforts in support of a particular approach to the matter in jurisdictions that have 
not yet ruled on the issue; in jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue but where it is 
ripe for reconsideration; or where LEL instructions are used as grounds for appealing 
an award as excessive. 
Second, empirical data would provide lawyers with useful strategic advice about 
whether (and how) to emphasize LEL evidence in arguing for pain and suffering dam-
ages. As awards were higher when these elements were treated separately, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in jurisdictions that already separate these damage elements might want to 
present thorough evidence of loss of enjoyment by the plaintiff. Third, data about 
whether monetary awards for emotional distress are higher when these two elements 
of damages are treated separately should also be useful for judges and other legal pol-
icymakers. Courts and policymakers often make assumptions about juror psychology 
that are unsubstantiated by empirical data (Saks, 1989,1992). The present data could 
help courts and bar associations in drafting more effective pattern jury instructions. 
A better understanding of the effect of alternative approaches to jury instructions on 
LEL could eventually lead to clearer and more precise instructions, which would, in 
turn, facilitate jurors’ task in assessing damages (Dock v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Interna-
tional, 2001). 
One of the objections to LEL damages is that they are too speculative and there-
fore diffi cult for jurors to quantify (e.g., Slesinger, 1996). However, it is not clear that 
the task of quantifying LEL is any more speculative than the task of quantifying pain 
and suffering, and this same criticism has been deemed inadequate as an argument for 
barring the latter type of damages (Dobbs, 1973; O’Connell & Bailey, 1972). The at-
tempt to quantify noneconomic damages, including LEL, is not a science for the sim-
ple and obvious reason that money is not commensurate with emotional stability and 
MEASURING DAMAGES FOR LOST ENJOYMENT OF LIFE                                  65
the absence of pain. There is not, and likely never will be, a market in noneconomic 
damages. As one group of scholars put it, 
If art can acquire a market value, in principle, so can the loss of sight. The problem is that 
people do not normally buy and sell the sorts of sensory, motor, cognitive, and other capac-
ities that are injured in accidents. The result is that to compensate for noneconomic losses, 
the law must turn to an alternative source of values, namely, the social judgment of the com-
munity, typically supplied by juries. A task that involves assigning a value to the virtually 
undefi nable is, by defi nition, challenging to perform and at least as challenging to evaluate. 
(Wissler, Hart, & Saks, 1999, p. 757) 
Money might offer solace, or a sense of vindication, to one who is suffering emo-
tional distress (Jaffe, 1953), but ultimately it cannot put the plaintiff in her rightful 
position the way, for example, money for the purchase of a new car can replace a 
damaged car, or money for lost wages can preserve the economic status of a plaintiff. 
Judges and commentators have long recognized this (McDougald v. Garber, 1989; 
Radin, 1993; Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1965, §903, cmt. a), and it accounts for 
much of the skepticism with which judges have greeted expert testimony about LEL.6 
As one court recently put it, “No amount of expert testimony on the value of life 
could possibly help a jury decide that diffi cult question [of the value of LEL]. A life 
is not a stock, car, home, or other such item bought and sold in some marketplace” 
(Loth v. Truck-A-Way, 1998, p. 767). 
We were recently, and tragically, reminded of the complexity of awarding these dam-
ages by the furor over the September 11 compensation scheme. As part of Section 402 
(7) of the “September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,” established by Title IV of 
the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act of 2001, the term noneconomic losses 
is defi ned as “losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, mental anguish, disfi gurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and 
companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damag-
es, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.” 
The special master in charge of promulgating rules for distribution of the fund to 
victims’ families, Kenneth Feinberg, stating that he did not want to “play Solomon” 
(Pay for victims not pain-based, 2001) decided to give a set amount of noneconom-
ic damages to each victim and to each victim’s spouse and children (the fi nal amounts 
were $250,000 per victim and $100,000 for spouse and each child), rather than try to 
determine on a case-by-case basis the level of suffering of each claimant. The storm 
of protest that this decision set off illustrates the centrality, and complexity, of non-
economic damages in current tort litigation. Many of the comments on the Interim Fi-
nal Rule contended that this amount of money for noneconomic damages is woefully 
inadequate and much more is routinely awarded in court.7 News reports confi rm that 
the perceived inadequacy of the noneconomic damages is one of the reasons many of 
the victims’ families may choose not to be compensated by the fund and instead to 
take their chances in court (O’Brien, 2002). 
6 One court dismissed this objection by pointing out that “[t]he rule against recovery of ‘spec-
ulative damages’ is generally directed against uncertainty as to cause rather than uncertainty as to 
measure or extent” (Sherrod v. Berry, 1985/1988, p. 164). 
7 See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim_03n.html for comments on the Interim 
Final Rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
Debate about duplication of damages, and over and undercompensation for noneco-
nomic harms, is at one level a debate about intuition, about what feels like too much or 
too little compensation for a particular emotional reaction, whether it be pain, humili-
ation, grief, or the loss experienced by one who can no longer play with her grandchil-
dren. The jury experiment described in this paper is an attempt to measure those intu-
itions, but not to assess their accuracy. Our fi ndings suggest that jury awards for non-
economic damages are indeed higher when mock jurors are asked to make separate 
awards for pain and suffering and LEL, and that this effect is mediated by differences 
in how the plaintiff’s injury is perceived as a function of the judicial instructions. 
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